{"id":21754,"date":"2026-04-17T14:03:36","date_gmt":"2026-04-17T14:03:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/youthdemocracycohort.com\/?post_type=storiesprojects&p=21754"},"modified":"2026-04-21T19:20:36","modified_gmt":"2026-04-21T19:20:36","slug":"chapter-2-by-mehmet-ilhanli","status":"publish","type":"storiesprojects","link":"https:\/\/youthdemocracycohort.com\/fr\/stories\/chapter-2-by-mehmet-ilhanli\/","title":{"rendered":"Chapter 2. by Mehmet \u0130lhanl\u0131"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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The Impact of Young People\u2019s Securitisation on Youth Activism in T\u00fcrkiye, by Mehmet \u0130lhanl\u0131<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye has a long tradition of youth activism, in which student movements have historically played a pivotal role in shaping the country\u2019s political landscape. While such activism has often faced challenges from the state, the 2013 Gezi Park protests marked a turning point in Turkish political history. In the aftermath of these youth-led demonstrations, which directly confronted the government\u2019s authority, the Turkish state increasingly began to securitise politically active young people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By framing these young citizens as a threat to national stability, the government justified the use of extraordinary security measures, heightened surveillance, and criminalising narratives. This process of securitisation has effectively marginalised young people\u2019s activism and systematically excluded them from political participation. This study investigates how such securitisation strategies have transformed the nature of youth political engagement in the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye currently has the largest youth population in the country\u2019s history, yet this demographic\u2019s potential to influence democratic processes is overlooked and often suppressed.[i]<\/sup><\/a> Recent research, including a 2022 report by KONDA Research & Consultancy, reveals strikingly low levels of youth political involvement, with only 4% engaged in civil society organisations and just 5% registered as members of political parties.[ii]<\/sup><\/a> These findings are underscored by the European Partnership for Democracy\u2019s 2025 Global Youth Participation Index, in which T\u00fcrkiye scored only 55 out of 100.[iii]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Rather than signalling political apathy, this trend points to a deeper sense of alienation produced by the systemic exclusion and repression of T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s young people. The resulting marginalisation constrains youth participation in political processes and decision-making while accelerating democratic erosion and weakening political resilience, as reflected in T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s declining scores in major global democracy indices.[iv]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Through in-depth interviews and focus groups, this study foregrounds the lived experiences of young people in T\u00fcrkiye. Drawing on participants\u2019 accounts, the research examines how securitisation processes have shaped young people\u2019s political engagement and constrained their modes of participation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Mehmet \u0130lhanl\u0131 <\/strong>is a PhD candidate in Geography at the National University of Singapore and co-founder of Young Peacebuilders of Turkey, whose work focuses on youth roles in peacebuilding, securitisation, and ethnic conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Get to know Mehmet<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n
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Methodology<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

This qualitative research draws on 10 semistructured interviews with youth activists and policy experts aged 18\u201335 as well as four focus group discussions with participants in recent youth-led movements. Each focus group included between three and five people. Data was collected online and face to face from February to November 2025. Fieldwork took place in Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, and Diyarbak\u0131r, cities chosen for their political diversity and histories of youth mobilisation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The findings of this study are not intended to be generalised. This limitation stems from two main factors. First, the interviewees and focus group participants constitute a relatively visible circle of youth activism, selected specifically because of the state\u2019s repression of them. While these cases are not representative of all young people, they are analytically significant in that they exemplify broader patterns of youth securitisation in T\u00fcrkiye. Second, all participants were based in urban settings, so the experiences and impacts discussed cannot be directly extended to rural youth populations. Within this scope, the data reveals experiences of criminalisation, perceptions of political participation and activism, and the impact of securitised political spaces on young people in urban settings.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

All conversations were audio-recorded with the participants\u2019 consent, transcribed, translated, and thematically analysed. Ethical principles were clearly communicated orally before and at the end of each interview and were strictly observed throughout the research process. To ensure confidentiality, all participants were assigned pseudonyms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The context of youth activism in T\u00fcrkiye<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In 2021, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan delivered these words to a youth event in Ankara:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The youth we need is one that, just like we see here today, is wholeheartedly devoted to their country and nation, equipped with all the capabilities of the modern age, guided by a strong sense of direction, and fully aware of where they are headed. We do not divide our youth into letters or generations. From A to Z, we embrace all of them through works, services, and initiatives that unite rather than separate.[v]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In another statement in 2012, shared on Twitter (now X), he said: \u201cThe goal is 2071, young people. God willing, we will build 2023, and hopefully, you will build 2071.\u201d[vi]<\/sup><\/a> These remarks referred to T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s official vision projects for 2071, which the ruling Justice and Development Party has promoted as milestones for shaping the nation\u2019s future. In this framework, young people are seen as key actors in building a \u201cnew T\u00fcrkiye\u201d, but only if they conform to the vision defined by the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Erdo\u011fan\u2019s frequent emphasis on young people as bearers of \u201cnational ideals\u201d constructs a selective vision of this demographic. Young people are perceived not just as individuals with agency, but as vessels of a particular ideological mission. Ideal young people in this context are described as pious, nationalist, technologically competent, and obedient to the state\u2019s moral and political values. While Erdo\u011fan claims to embrace all young people \u201cfrom A to Z\u201d, in practice there is a deep division between those who align with this vision and those who do not.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This division produces two opposing models of young people. On the one hand are those who are loyal to the government\u2019s religious and nationalist values. On the other hand, any youth group that expresses dissent, adopts opposition ideologies, or engages in political activism outside state-sanctioned channels is portrayed as a threat to the national order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Such youth groups are often subjected to various forms of securitisation. This concept refers to a process in which political actors frame particular issues or groups as security threats to justify extraordinary measures beyond normal political procedures.[vii]<\/sup><\/a> While securitisation is primarily a discursive act, scholars have emphasised that the context in which it unfolds, as well as the power dynamics that shape it, must also be taken into account.[viii]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

These dynamics help explain how securitising moves not only rely on speech acts but also permeate institutions, bureaucracies, and practices. It can therefore be argued that the success of an attempt at securitisation depends on its discursive acceptance as well as how embedded it is in institutions and how it is enacted in practice.[ix]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Youth securitisation has been widely discussed in the context of global and regional peace and security.[x]<\/sup><\/a> Recent research has expanded to examine youth-led dissident movements and state responses at the national level.[xi]<\/sup><\/a> In the Turkish case, youth securitisation involves the discursive construction of particular dissident groups of young people as \u201cunstable, deviant [and] potentially degenerate\u201d figures who are perceived as a threat to the stability of the state and the social order.[xii]<\/sup><\/a> At the same time, it encompasses institutional practices, from policing to legal restrictions, that translate these discourses into security-oriented constraints on youth political participation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although securitising narratives against young people have intensified in recent years, they are not unique to the current government. Throughout the second half of the 20th century, young people in T\u00fcrkiye were labelled as foreign agents, deviants, or tools of western influence and subjected to state violence and repression.[xiii]<\/sup><\/a> Viewed through this lens, there is continuity in youth securitisation over time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the 2013 Gezi Park protests marked a significant turning point. According to several polls, most of the protesters were young people.[xiv]<\/sup><\/a> In response to the demonstrations, the Turkish government began to frame the protests not as a social movement but as an attempted coup. As a result, securitising narratives intensified, and young people were cast as agents of chaos and moral decay. One example of this discourse can be seen in the following government-aligned statement:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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We did not see the youth of the Gezi Park violent protests out on the streets … Amid all this diversity, everyone was there, but the violent children of Gezi, the vulgar revolutionaries, were not. Because they were never truly part of this society. They were always marginal, always incidental, always troublemakers \u2026 They didn\u2019t just loot cash machines and shops; they also burned, destroyed, and looted the sanctities, common ground, and shared values of this country and society.[xv]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In the years after the Gezi Park protests, this framing was repeatedly invoked to criminalise youth-led activism. Many participants were arrested and imprisoned. Subsequent youth movements \u2013 such as the Bo\u011fazi\u00e7i University Student Protests, the Bar\u0131nam\u0131yoruz Movement, 1,000 Youth for Palestine, and, most recently, the 19 March Protests \u2013 have also been criminalised and their young participants targeted with similar securitising narratives.[xvi]<\/sup><\/a> Government figures often portray these movements as renewed Gezi Park\u2013style attempts, reinforcing the notion that youth activism that challenges the government threatens national unity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The impact of this securitisation has been profound. Many young people, in the face of criminalisation, legal risks, and shrinking civic space, have retreated from formal avenues of political participation. In 2022, only 4% of young people in T\u00fcrkiye took part in civil society organisations, and approximately <\/a>80% <\/a>[MI1]<\/a> [BY2]<\/a> were neither affiliated with a political party nor considered joining one.[xvii]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Experiences of youth securitisation<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

This section examines how youth securitisation was experienced and interpreted by the research participants, with particular attention on state discourses, institutional practices, and their consequences for youth political engagement. The findings are organised around key thematic patterns that illustrate the multifaceted impact of securitisation on youth activism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cAcceptable\u201d versus \u201cunacceptable\u201d youth activism<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

A significant majority of participants agreed that the Turkish state increasingly perceives youth movements that are not pro-government as potential security threats, rather than as democratic and legal actors. This perception is often tied to the duality of \u201cour youth\u201d (that is, the government\u2019s) versus \u201cnot our youth\u201d.[xviii]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This duality refers to the boundaries set by the government: as long as youth activism remains outside the government\u2019s threat perception, it is considered acceptable. However, once this boundary is crossed, youth activism becomes a matter of security. One interviewee illustrated this point with an example from his own life:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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We were holding a small youth gathering somewhere. Outside the door, there were three anti-riot water cannon vehicles, five armoured vehicles, 50 riot police, and maybe 10 undercover officers. There was always this constant sense of being perceived as a security threat.[xix]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Tactics to prevent youth activism<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Youth is a transitional period from puberty to adulthood, during which young people prepare for the responsibilities of adult life. For this transition to be healthy, young people\u2019s economic, social, and political needs must be fulfilled. When these needs are not met, young people begin to demand them through various mechanisms, particularly activism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In T\u00fcrkiye, once the government perceives these demands as a threat, it employs certain tactics and measures to suppress them. One of the most apparent tactics, mentioned by several participants, is economic sanctions:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Participant 1: So even if you don\u2019t think like them, you\u2019re forced to stay on their side. Because they put you under economic pressure.

Participant 2: For example, I know from my friends, some of them are very oppositional, but at the end of the day, because they\u2019re unemployed, it is turned into a kind of joke. Like, \u201cI am going to close my Instagram account and open a new one, with a suit, a Turkish flag, and references to the presidency.\u201d It\u2019s a joke, but it\u2019s based on reality.

Participant 1: Yes, definitely, the first layer of pressure is economic sanctions.[xx]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In addition to the state, the family is also considered to hold authority over young people in T\u00fcrkiye. To suppress youth movements, the state seeks to collaborate with families and uses them as a means to control the young. One participant emphasised that families are often mobilised to prevent young people from engaging in activism:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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What they [the authorities] do is very concrete \u2013 for example, they call the families first and tell them their children are involved with terrorist organisations. By creating distance between the youth and their families and triggering a reaction from the parents, they aim to push young people away from these movements.[xxi]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Another tactic highlighted in interviews was to threaten young people with consequences that affect their future. The government attempts to discourage young people from engaging in activism by restricting their access to public-sector jobs:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Once your photo or video is taken, you\u2019re done. You won\u2019t be able to work in any government institution. That\u2019s the kind of message they\u2019re trying to send. Naturally, this creates a sense of fear among young people.[xxii]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The impact of securitisation on youth activism<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Youth securitisation in T\u00fcrkiye has had a profound effect on how young people perceive and engage with political life. Based on the interviews and focus groups analysed in this study, five key patterns emerge: fear, political disengagement, re-engagement with the far right, fragmentation, and emotional fatigue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Across all interviews and focus groups, the most consistent theme was the internalisation of fear. Participants described a political climate in which even attending a peaceful protest could have long-term professional and legal consequences.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another dominant theme was disengagement from conventional politics. This retreat is rooted not in apathy but in distrust with systems that are perceived as exclusionary and unresponsive. As civic space narrows and repression increases, young people tend to distance themselves from conventional avenues and seek alternative forms of politics:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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So, after the Gezi [Park] protests in 2013, many more young people got involved [in politics and activism]. During that period, youth participation increased significantly, with some youth organisations growing from 50 to 500 members. But after 2015, this trend reversed dramatically … Now, even joining a youth association or political party makes people hesitate and overthink their decisions.[xxiii]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In some cases, youth disengagement from traditional politics leads not to apathy but to a turn towards radical far-right ideologies. Frustrated by economic and social insecurities, some young people seek a sense of safety and belonging in nationalist or exclusionary movements.[xxiv]<\/sup><\/a> According to the participants in one of the focus groups, this shift reflects a broader crisis caused by youth securitisation:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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In general, young people are searching for political alternatives. And this search is not limited to T\u00fcrkiye. It is part of a global trend where [the system] is pushing young people towards more antidemocratic alternatives and right-wing discourse.[xxv]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

According to another respondent, the repression of youth activism creates a duality in which those already involved become radicalised, while potential young activists are driven by fear and gradually withdraw:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Participation in those protests and interest in these issues tend to deepen the political engagement of young people already involved. But at the same time, it pushes away those who are politically interested but remain distant. In other words, it radicalises those on the inside while deradicalising and distancing those observing from the outside.[xxvi]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The government\u2019s securitisation of young people not only suppresses dissent but also actively works to divide the youth population. By labelling some young people as acceptable and others as threats, according to one respondent, the government fractures solidarity and prevents collective political action:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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During the Gezi [Park] protests, people from all political parties were present and everyone was united under a common language and shared cause. But now, for example, [People\u2019s Equality and Democracy] Party supporters have been beaten and excluded. This is clearly a result of deep polarisation, which itself is a consequence of the government\u2019s systematic policies.[xxvii]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Finally, years of the state\u2019s punitive responses and increasing polarisation have left many young people emotionally exhausted. Feelings of hopelessness, frustration, and alienation are widespread, particularly among those who once believed in the transformative power of collective action:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Young people have a good understanding of T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s recent history. They see that things ended up like this because people did not speak out in the past. The young people I spoke with, those who join protests, are fully aware of all these problems. But they say: \u201cI am afraid. I am really afraid.\u201d They are scared of becoming unemployed, of having no future.[xxviii]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

As T\u00fcrkiye continues to experience a democratic decline, the country\u2019s largest-ever youth population, which comprises 22.7% of the total, is feeling the impacts most acutely.[xxix]<\/sup><\/a> Young people are not disengaged from politics by nature; rather, they are systematically excluded, stigmatised, and securitised. While many continue to fight for a more democratic and just society, their activism is often met with repression, surveillance, and criminalisation. This not only weakens democratic resilience in the country but also erodes youth trust in institutions and traditional politics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite these challenges, young people have not given up. They continue to seek alternative spaces for political expression. However, unless the securitising lens through which the state views young people is dismantled, true democratic inclusion will remain elusive. The de-securitisation of young people and the enabling of their meaningful participation are therefore not merely youth issues but central tasks for the future of democracy in T\u00fcrkiye. Supporting young people as political agents, not as threats, is essential for any inclusive and resilient democratic transformation in the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Explore the Full Study<\/strong><\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n
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This chapter is part of a Deep Dive of Young Researchers who worked on Youth Participation for three years. This deep dive is a global collection of 12 case studies unpacking how young people are reshaping political engagement.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Young Researchers\u2019 Network<\/strong> is an initiative developed in the framework of the European Democracy Hub<\/a><\/strong> and EPD\u2019s Women and Youth in Democracy<\/a><\/strong> WYDE Civic Engagement<\/strong> project, supported by the European Union.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Get to know the 12 Young Researchers<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n
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[i]<\/a> \u201cJoint statement on the deepening democratic crisis and the systematic suppression of youth-led mobilisation in T\u00fcrkiye\u201d, European Youth Forum, 28 March 2025, https:\/\/www.youthforum.org\/news\/statement-on-deepening-democratic-crisis-and-the-systematic-suppression-of-youth-led-mobilisation-in-turkiye<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[ii]<\/a> KONDA Research & Consultancy, \u201cGen\u00e7lerin \u0130nsan Haklar\u0131 Alg\u0131s\u0131\u201d [Young People\u2019s Perceptions of Human Rights], Hakikat Adalet Haf\u0131za Merkezi, 2022, https:\/\/hakikatadalethafiza.org\/yayinlar\/genclerin-insan-haklari-algisi-kamuoyu-arastirmasi<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[iii]<\/a> \u201cExplore Youth Participation in T\u00fcrkiye\u201d, Global Youth Participation Index, European Partnership for Democracy, 2025, https:\/\/gypi.epd.eu\/country-reports\/tr<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[iv]<\/a> \u201cFreedom in the World 2025\u201d, Freedom House, 2025; \u201cDemocracy Index 2024: What\u2019s wrong with representative democracy?\u201d, Economist Intelligence Unit, 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[v]<\/a> \u201cCumhurba\u015fkan\u0131 Erdo\u011fan, Ba\u015fkent Millet Bah\u00e7esi\u2019nde ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilen Yerel Y\u00f6netimler Gen\u00e7lik Festivali\u2019ne kat\u0131ld\u0131\u201d [President Erdo\u011fan attended the Local Administrations Youth Festival held at the Ba\u015fkent Nation\u2019s Garden], Communications Directorate of the Turkish Presidency, 17 November 2021, https:\/\/www.iletisim.gov.tr\/turkce\/yerel_basin\/detay\/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-baskent-millet-bahcesinde-gerceklestirilen-yerel-yonetimler-genclik-festivaline-katildi<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[vi]<\/a> Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan, \u201cHedef 2071 gen\u00e7ler. Rabbim l\u00fctfederse bizler 2023’\u00fc, \u0130n\u015fallah sizler de 2071’i in\u015fa edeceksiniz\u201d [Our goal is 2071, young people. God willing, we will build 2023, and you will build 2071], X, 30 September 2012, accessed 16 July 2025, https:\/\/x.com\/RTErdogan\/status\/252349407981355008<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[vii]<\/a> Barry Buzan, Ole W\u00e6ver, and Jaap De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis<\/em> (London: Lynne Rienner Pub, 1997).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[viii]<\/a> Thierry Balzacq, \u201cThe Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context\u201d, European Journal of International Relations<\/em> 11, no. 2 (2005): 171\u2013201.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[ix]<\/a> Ole W\u00e6ver, \u201cThe theory act: Responsibility and exactitude as seen from securitization\u201d, International Relations<\/em> 29, no. 1 (2015): 121\u201327.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[x]<\/a> Mayssoun Sukarieh and Stuart Tannock, \u201cThe global securitisation of youth\u201d, Third World Quarterly<\/em> 39, no. 5 (2018): 854\u201370.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xi]<\/a> Kerman Calvo and Martin Portos, \u201cSecuritization, Repression, and the Criminalization of Young People\u2019s Dissent: An Introduction\u201d, Revista Internacional de Sociolog\u00eda<\/em> 77, no. 4 (2019): 1\u20136; Juan Garc\u00eda-Garc\u00eda and Kerman Calvo Borobia, \u201cRepressing the Masses: Newspapers and the Securitisation of Youth Dissent in Spain\u201d, Revista Internacional de Sociolog\u00eda<\/em> 77, no. 4 (2019).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xii]<\/a> Emma Murphy, \u201cThe In-securitisation of Youth in the South and East Mediterranean\u201d, The International Spectator<\/em> 53, no. 2 (2018): 21\u201337.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xiii]<\/a> Demet L\u00fck\u00fcsl\u00fc, \u201cCreating a pious generation: youth and education policies of the AKP in Turkey\u201d, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies<\/em>, 2016.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xiv]<\/a> \u201cGezi Raporu: Toplumun \u2018Gezi Park\u0131 Olaylar\u0131\u2019 alg\u0131s\u0131 – Gezi Park\u0131ndakiler kimlerdi?\u201d [Gezi Report: Public Perception of the \u201cGezi Park Events\u201d \u2013 Who were the people in Gezi Park?], KONDA Research & Consultancy, 2014, https:\/\/konda.com.tr\/rapor\/67\/gezi-raporu<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xv]<\/a> \u0130smail \u00c7a\u011flar, \u201cGezi\u2019nin \u015eedit ve Vandal Gen\u00e7leri\u201d [The Violent and Vandalistic Youth of Gezi], SETA Foundation, 1 June 2017, https:\/\/www.setav.org\/kose-yazilari\/gezinin-sedit-ve-vandal-gencleri<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xvi]<\/a> Bo\u011fazi\u00e7i University Student Protests is a movement that began in 2021 against the president\u2019s appointment of a rector, demanding academic freedom and university autonomy. Bar\u0131nam\u0131yoruz Movement is a student-led protest that highlights T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s housing crisis by sleeping in parks to draw attention to unaffordable rent and dormitory fees. 1,000 Youth for Palestine is a youth-led initiative that has mobilised thousands of young people in solidarity with Palestine, organising demonstrations against Israeli policies. 19 March Protests is a wave of protests sparked by a court ruling that paved the way for the removal of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem \u0130mamo\u011flu.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xvii]<\/a> KONDA, \u201cGen\u00e7lerin\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xviii]<\/a> In-depth interview no. 5, 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xix]<\/a> In-depth interview no. 7, 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xx]<\/a> Focus group discussion no. 1, 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xxi]<\/a> In-depth interview no. 4, 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xxii]<\/a> In-depth interview no. 2, 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xxiii]<\/a> In-depth interview no. 5, 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xxiv]<\/a> Demet L\u00fck\u00fcsl\u00fc and Beg\u00fcm Uzun, \u201cT\u00fcrkiye – Committed Democrats Yet Ardent Nationalists: Turkey\u2019s Youth: at the Crossroads\u201d, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2024; \u201cGen\u00e7lerin Politik Tercihleri Ara\u015ft\u0131rmas\u0131\u201d [Research on Political Preferences of the Youth], Gen\u00e7lik \u00d6rg\u00fctleri Forumu, 2024.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xxv]<\/a> Focus group discussion no. 2, 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xxvi]<\/a> In-depth interview no. 4, 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xxvii]<\/a> In-depth interview no. 1, 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xxviii]<\/a> In-depth interview no. 1, 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xxix]<\/a> \u201cYouth Policy in T\u00fcrkiye\u201d, European Commission, 21 July 2025, https:\/\/national-policies.eacea.ec.europa.eu\/youthwiki\/chapters\/turkey\/overview?utm_source=chatgpt.com<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n

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The Impact of Young People\u2019s Securitisation on Youth Activism in T\u00fcrkiye, by Mehmet \u0130lhanl\u0131 T\u00fcrkiye has a long tradition of youth activism, in which student movements have historically played a pivotal role in shaping the country\u2019s political landscape. While such activism has often faced challenges from the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":21755,"template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"story-category":[94],"project-category":[242],"project-region":[314],"story-tag":[110,93,30],"class_list":["post-21754","storiesprojects","type-storiesprojects","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","story-category-research-content","project-category-wyde-civic-engagement","project-region-europe-central-asia","story-tag-research-on-youth-political-participation","story-tag-young-researchers-network","story-tag-youth-engagement"],"acf":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/youthdemocracycohort.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/storiesprojects\/21754","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/youthdemocracycohort.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/storiesprojects"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/youthdemocracycohort.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/storiesprojects"}],"version-history":[{"count":16,"href":"https:\/\/youthdemocracycohort.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/storiesprojects\/21754\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":22144,"href":"https:\/\/youthdemocracycohort.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/storiesprojects\/21754\/revisions\/22144"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/youthdemocracycohort.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/21755"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/youthdemocracycohort.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=21754"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"story-category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/youthdemocracycohort.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/story-category?post=21754"},{"taxonomy":"project-category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/youthdemocracycohort.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/project-category?post=21754"},{"taxonomy":"project-region","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/youthdemocracycohort.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/project-region?post=21754"},{"taxonomy":"story-tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/youthdemocracycohort.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/story-tag?post=21754"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}