{"id":6436,"date":"2024-07-01T08:06:14","date_gmt":"2024-07-01T08:06:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/youthdemocracycohort.com\/?post_type=storiesprojects&p=6436"},"modified":"2025-11-20T16:24:47","modified_gmt":"2025-11-20T16:24:47","slug":"morocco-youth-political-participation","status":"publish","type":"storiesprojects","link":"https:\/\/youthdemocracycohort.com\/fr\/stories\/morocco-youth-political-participation\/","title":{"rendered":"Morocco – Youth Political Participation"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
<\/div>\n\n\n\n

The political and socio-economic context of Morocco has been shaped by the hopes that arose following the Arab uprisings over a decade ago. However, most of the planned reforms are yet to be introduced. The persistent issues of limited separation of powers and corruption have a profound impact on the rule of law and undermine the principles of good governance. The judicial system has been exploited to punish political opponents, activists, and critics. Alarming incidents, such as the detention of journalists and human rights activists, have threatened civil liberties and freedom of expression1<\/a><\/sup>. Morocco faces numerous socio-economic challenges, with social inequalities persisting between different classes and urban-rural areas. One of the pressing issues is unemployment, especially among the youth, which has resulted in their marginalisation. The growth of the youth population, coupled with their economic and political marginalisation and their pivotal role in social movements, has brought youth issues to the forefront of public concern2<\/a><\/sup>. Young people have become a central element of State discourse since the 2000s and a priority issue for King Mohammed VI, who called for a better representation of youth in public affairs in several speeches3<\/a><\/sup>. In Morocco, the king’s support is a crucial factor in bringing a topic to the political agenda.
While Moroccan youth express their views on social media, or sometimes by organising demonstrations, only 1% of them are members of political parties or trade unions4<\/a><\/sup>. During an interview, Benissa, a youth activist, highlighted the significant involvement of young people in non-conventional forms of political participation. He also admitted that youth engagement in formal politics is still lacking, despite some progress made on this front. The experiences of marginalisation that young people face in Morocco, coupled with distrust in political institutions, create barriers and disincentives to more traditional ways of political participation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Understanding youth-focused policies and initiatives<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Legal framework: <\/em>The 2011 Moroccan Constitution and subsequent organic laws establish a legal and institutional framework that introduces several forms of citizen participation in public affairs. The Constitution contains specific provisions on the political involvement of young people: \u201cIt is the responsibility of public authorities to take all appropriate measures to extend and generalise the participation of youth in society, economics, culture and politics of the country\u201d. It also calls for the creation of various consultative bodies, including the Consultative Council of Youth and Associative Action, and the principle of consulting civil society in developing, implementing, and evaluating public policies, allowing citizens to formulate legislative motions and petitions. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Parliamentary youth quota: <\/em>In 2011, the parliament passed an electoral law, which, among other reforms, introduced a youth quota in the Moroccan House of Representatives. Rather than being a result of an organised social movement or a top-down inclusivity reform, its adoption was a consequence of several interplaying factors, with young party activists playing a key role in the process5<\/a><\/sup>. The adoption of the gender quota paved the way for youth claims, and the generational conflict between the old and young generations of party activists encouraged the establishment of a multi-partisan youth coalition that led the adoption negotiations. Finally, the spread of youth-friendly narratives and the emergence of new spaces for youth participation facilitated the negotiation process. As a result, the new electoral law introduced a youth quota providing 30 reserved seats for candidates under 40 years old in the Moroccan Parliament. Initially, the quota was reserved exclusively for male candidates. In 2016, it started to cover female candidates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Youth strategy and programmes: <\/em>The Ministry of Youth, Culture, and Communication (and its predecessor the Ministry of Youth and Sport) is responsible for developing and implementing government policy in the area of youth. To provide guidance for public policies and steer the intervention of all stakeholders in the realm of youth policies, Morocco\u2019s National Youth Strategy 2015\u20132030 has been developed. It was internationally praised as \u201can example of a comprehensive plan and strategy, including concrete action plans, preliminary indicators of implementation outcomes, and an extensive M&E plan6<\/a><\/sup>\u201d. In 2018, another document was developed, the New National Initiative for Moroccan Youth, notably by a different institution \u2013 the Economic, Social, and Environmental Council (CESE). The CESE is a constitutional institution that performs advisory functions on economic and social public policies by applying a participatory and consultative approach. Both the National Youth Strategy and the New National Initiative prioritised youth participation in public affairs and civic life. Furthermore, government websites mention a number of initiatives promoting youth engagement, such as Youth Houses and Child Parliament, and fostering economic inclusion, such as \u2018Forsa\u2019 and \u2018Awrach\u2019 programmes. However, information on the design, structure, and actual implementation of these initiatives is limited.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Policy implementation<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Words over actions: <\/em>Despite the establishment of a legal framework and the spread of youth-friendly narratives, there has been a notable discrepancy between the laws adopted, the discourse, and the actual implementation of these mechanisms. Moroccan civil society was not adequately informed about the legal changes introduced, leading to most petitions being rejected due to procedural irregularities7<\/a><\/sup>. Although the plans to establish the Consultative Council of Youth were referred to in several policy documents, it remains inactive8<\/a><\/sup>. Morocco\u2019s National Youth Strategy 2015\u20132030 was discontinued; and the recommendations of the New National Initiative for Moroccan Youth from 2018 do not seem to be actioned upon from the institutional perspective. The situation is mostly due to frequent personnel changes in the Ministry of Youth resulting in a lack of continuity9<\/a><\/sup>. Preparations for the Council of Youth seem to be underway, but there are concerns whether this body will represent the full diversity of youth voices, following the recommendations of civil society and grassroots organisations, or rather become co-opted by political parties or other vested interests10<\/a><\/sup>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Parliamentary youth quota: <\/em>The introduction of a youth quota in the Moroccan parliament was a significant step towards increasing youth representation. In Morocco, the quota almost doubled the presence of youth deputies in the lower house, increasing from 12% in 2007 to 22% in 201111<\/a><\/sup>. Despite controversies regarding the level of political nepotism on the youth electoral list, Moroccan activists see youth quota as a helpful instrument to encourage young people’s engagement in politics. According to Hassan, the co-founder of a youth-led initiative encouraging young Moroccans to vote, entering the political arena without affirmative action is extremely difficult for a young person without influential connections or a powerful family background. Despite the strong opposition of youth groups12<\/a><\/sup>, the youth quota was abolished for the 2021 elections. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Key Successes<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Improved youth participation in politics<\/em>: There are few public programmes specifically tailored for youth, and existing programmes lack relevant indicators to assess their impact on the political, social, and cultural aspects of young people’s lives. However, Morocco’s efforts to improve youth political participation have seen some successes. Specifically, young Moroccans interviewed shared the perception that youth participation and interest in politics have improved over recent years13<\/a><\/sup>, even though significant progress is still needed. Several independent surveys confirm Moroccan youth\u2019s interest in politics, mostly expressed in non-traditional ways14<\/a><\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Effective communication with youth:<\/em> The efforts of the government to educate and communicate effectively with the youth are commendable, despite being poorly coordinated and inconsistent. Several public officials have utilised social media and new technologies to connect with young people, address their concerns, present and explain key initiatives undertaken by the government. Furthermore, some institutions and actors actively advocate for and support youth engagement. According to Hassan, the Economic, Social and Environmental Council is an institution \u201cwhich takes a step towards youth, which studies youth-related policies, and which responds dynamically to youth issues15<\/a><\/sup>\u201d. The openness and willingness to connect with the young generation might stem from the institution’s autonomy and structure, which are relatively unaffected by the influence of political elites\u2019 vested interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Building political consciousness from an early age: <\/em>Among successful programmes in terms of political and civic education, the Child Parliament was mentioned. According to Benissa, early exposure to democratic processes is essential for the development of political and civic awareness: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cI find it very effective because we are creating a generation from scratch. From the beginning, we are giving them the tools and political consciousness. Most of the youth that I met, who were part of [the Child Parliament], are now working on social change or working on political change wanting to improve democracy in Morocco<\/em>16<\/a><\/sup>\u201d.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Affirmative action:<\/em> The temporary introduction of the quota increased youth representation in parliament. Interestingly, the system of reserved seats for youth in parliament is employed in only four countries around the world17<\/a><\/sup> and evidence suggests that youth quotas help increase youth representation18<\/a><\/sup>. Until now, there has been a noticeable decrease in the average age of parliament members and the government in Morocco. For instance, the average age of ministers in 2021 was 54.8 years old19<\/a><\/sup> <\/sup>, decreasing from 58 years old in 201920<\/a><\/sup>, and 57.2 years old in 201721<\/a><\/sup>. This is a positive step towards better representation and acknowledgment of the aspirations of young people in Moroccan public affairs. 

This case country is taken from a comprehensive examination of successful youth-led policy initiatives drawing from the insights of a scoping study \u201cA comparative analysis on National Youth Policies<\/strong>\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n

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\"Read<\/a><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n

This study is supported by a European Union-funded project called WYDE Civic Engagement led by EPD that aims to improve the inclusion of Youth in all levels of democratic participation at the national, regional and global scales.  The opinions expressed are those of the author(s) only and should not be considered as representative of the European Commission\u2019s official position.<\/p>\n\n\n

  1. Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2022 Country Report \u2014 Morocco<\/em> (G\u00fctersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2022).
    \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  2. Marta Garcia de Paredes and Thierry Desrues, \u00ab\u00a0Unravelling the adoption of youth quotas in African hybrid regimes: evidence from Morocco,\u00a0\u00bb Journal of Modern African Studies<\/em> 59, no. 1 (March 2021), https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/s0022278x20000646<\/a>. \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  3. \u00a0Including in 2003, in 2011, 2017, and 2018 \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  4. \u00ab\u00a0Participation politique des jeunes au Maroc,\u00a0\u00bb Lib\u00e9ration, February 18, 2020, https:\/\/www.libe.ma\/Participation-politique-des-jeunes-au-Maroc_a115751.html<\/a>. \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  5. The socio-political background of the adoption of youth quotas in Morocco is described in detail in Marta Garcia de Paredes and Thierry Desrues, \u00ab\u00a0Unravelling the adoption of youth quotas in African hybrid regimes: evidence from Morocco,\u00a0\u00bb Journal of Modern African Studies<\/em> 59, no. 1 (March 2021), https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/s0022278x20000646<\/a>.
    \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  6. ACE, \u00ab\u00a0Youth and Elections,\u00a0\u00bb ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, 2018, https:\/\/aceproject.org\/ace-en\/topics\/yt\/onePage<\/a>. \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  7. Hajar Bennani, Amine Mahdoud, and Maryem Saddiqui, POUR UNE PARTICIPATION EFFECTIVE DES JEUNES DANS LA VIE PUBLIQUE AU MAROC:La n\u00e9cessaire op\u00e9rationnalisation des m\u00e9canismes de la d\u00e9mocratie participative<\/em> (Rabat Social Studies Institute, 2021). \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  8. Including, now discontinued, Morocco\u2019s National Youth Strategy 2015-2030; and The New National Initiative for Moroccan Youth from 2018. \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  9. Interview with Ahmed, a former director within the Ministry of Youth and Sports \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  10. Interview with Hassan, a youth activist \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  11. Marta Garcia de Paredes and Thierry Desrues, \u00ab\u00a0Unravelling the adoption of youth quotas in African hybrid regimes: evidence from Morocco,\u00a0\u00bb Journal of Modern African Studies<\/em> 59, no. 1 (March 2021), https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/s0022278x20000646<\/a>. \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  12. \u00ab\u00a0Elections l\u00e9gislatives : Un mouvement de jeunesse pour une liste nationale d\u00e9di\u00e9e aux jeunes\u00a0\u00bb, Aujourd’hui le Maroc, August 25, 2011, https:\/\/aujourdhui.ma\/societe\/elections-legislatives-un-mouvement-de-jeunesse-pour-une-liste-nationale-dediee-aux-jeunes-78795<\/a>. \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  13. \u00a0Interviews with Hassan and Benissa \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  14. \u00a0For example, Olivier DEAU and David Goeury, \u00ab\u00a0\u00bfPodemos hablar de una generaci\u00f3n \u00ab\u00a020 de febrero\u00a0\u00bb? Preguntando a la juventud urbana marroqu\u00ed: identidad pol\u00edtica y participaci\u00f3n.,\u00a0\u00bb Revista de Estudios Internacionales Mediterr\u00e1neos<\/em>, no. 26 (June 25, 2019), https:\/\/doi.org\/10.15366\/reim2019.26.002<\/a>. or Saloua Zerhouni, Explaining Youth Participation and Non-Participation in Morocco<\/em> (Mohammed V University in Rabat, 2017). \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  15. \u00a0Interview with Hassan, a youth activist \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  16. \u00a0Interview with Benissa, a youth activist \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  17. Five more states use the system of legislated candidate quotas \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  18. InterParliamentary Union, Youth participation in national parliaments years of empowering youth in parliament 10<\/em> (IPU, 2021). \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  19. Hassan Benadad, \u00ab\u00a0Gouvernement: voici la moyenne d’\u00e2ge des nouveaux ministres,\u00a0\u00bb Le 360 Fran\u00e7ais, October 8, 2021, https:\/\/fr.le360.ma\/politique\/gouvernement-voici-la-moyenne-dage-des-nouveaux-ministres-247123\/<\/a>. \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  20. \u00ab\u00a0Nouveau gouvernement. L\u2019Ex\u00e9cutif le plus r\u00e9duit depuis Abdallah Ibrahim,\u00a0\u00bb LesEco.ma, October 11, 2019, https:\/\/leseco.ma\/maroc\/nouveau-gouvernement-l-executif-le-plus-reduit-depuis-abdallah-ibrahim.html<\/a>. \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  21. \u00ab\u00a057.2 ans, moyenne d\u2019\u00e2ge du gouvernement Tebboune!,\u00a0\u00bb Echorouk, May 27, 2017, https:\/\/www.echoroukonline.com\/57-2-ans-moyenne-dage-du-gouvernement-tebboune<\/a>. \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li><\/ol>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    The political and socio-economic context of Morocco has been shaped by the hopes that arose following the Arab uprisings over a decade ago. However, most of the planned reforms are yet to be introduced. The persistent issues of limited separation of powers and corruption have a profound […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":6558,"template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":"[{\"content\":\"Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2022 Country Report \u2014 Morocco<\/em> (G\u00fctersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2022).
    \",\"id\":\"3151f83e-b672-451e-a7ef-544a4c7e4f63\"},{\"content\":\"Marta Garcia de Paredes and Thierry Desrues, \\\"Unravelling the adoption of youth quotas in African hybrid regimes: evidence from Morocco,\\\" Journal of Modern African Studies<\/em> 59, no. 1 (March 2021),     https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/s0022278x20000646<\/a>.\",\"id\":\"9208f576-59f1-4ae6-84c4-7f6f757cc9c5\"},{\"content\":\"\u00a0Including in 2003, in 2011, 2017, and 2018\",\"id\":\"e9bf8673-2d7a-444a-b4c2-b96d47a0048e\"},{\"content\":\"\\\"Participation politique des jeunes au Maroc,\\\" Lib\u00e9ration, February 18, 2020, https:\/\/www.libe.ma\/Participation-politique-des-jeunes-au-Maroc_a115751.html<\/a>.\",\"id\":\"be3a7d93-72c0-441e-aab2-fa8befeeeab1\"},{\"content\":\"The socio-political background of the adoption of youth quotas in Morocco is described in detail in Marta Garcia de Paredes and Thierry Desrues, \\\"Unravelling the adoption of youth quotas in African hybrid regimes: evidence from Morocco,\\\" Journal of Modern African Studies<\/em> 59, no. 1 (March 2021), https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/s0022278x20000646<\/a>.
    \",\"id\":\"f88a0fc5-3d83-4ae0-a431-ecf9c68b2a77\"},{\"content\":\"ACE, \\\"Youth and Elections,\\\" ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, 2018,     https:\/\/aceproject.org\/ace-en\/topics\/yt\/onePage<\/a>.\",\"id\":\"7359a3f8-5164-4912-94f0-83d2bdb27cb1\"},{\"content\":\"Hajar Bennani, Amine Mahdoud, and Maryem Saddiqui, POUR UNE PARTICIPATION EFFECTIVE DES JEUNES DANS LA VIE PUBLIQUE AU MAROC:La n\u00e9cessaire op\u00e9rationnalisation des m\u00e9canismes de la d\u00e9mocratie participative<\/em> (Rabat Social Studies Institute, 2021).\",\"id\":\"f3d5887c-fc26-42d6-a9e7-cc34ff9f6f3a\"},{\"content\":\"Including, now discontinued, Morocco\u2019s National Youth Strategy 2015-2030; and The New National Initiative for Moroccan Youth from 2018.\",\"id\":\"44f62afd-d739-4c60-8b5e-4863c53cb5d5\"},{\"content\":\"Interview with Ahmed, a former director within the Ministry of Youth and Sports\",\"id\":\"e24dd2b8-0790-418e-8649-0fb56e4eb027\"},{\"content\":\"Interview with Hassan, a youth activist\",\"id\":\"650eba2b-c2e1-48ac-af37-228f611ad6a4\"},{\"content\":\"Marta Garcia de Paredes and Thierry Desrues, \\\"Unravelling the adoption of youth quotas in African hybrid regimes: evidence from Morocco,\\\" Journal of Modern African Studies<\/em> 59, no. 1 (March 2021), https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/s0022278x20000646<\/a>.\",\"id\":\"66bc835d-a68e-4380-922b-1ff98590adcf\"},{\"content\":\"\\\"Elections l\u00e9gislatives : Un mouvement de jeunesse pour une liste nationale d\u00e9di\u00e9e aux jeunes\\\", Aujourd'hui le Maroc, August 25, 2011, https:\/\/aujourdhui.ma\/societe\/elections-legislatives-un-mouvement-de-jeunesse-pour-une-liste-nationale-dediee-aux-jeunes-78795<\/a>.\",\"id\":\"092fb3f1-e40f-4b6b-9891-3bf65fe539e2\"},{\"content\":\"\u00a0Interviews with Hassan and Benissa\",\"id\":\"2f953176-0ae5-4607-966e-d617da6c8944\"},{\"content\":\"\u00a0For example, Olivier DEAU and David Goeury, \\\"\u00bfPodemos hablar de una generaci\u00f3n \\\"20 de febrero\\\"? Preguntando a la juventud urbana marroqu\u00ed: identidad pol\u00edtica y participaci\u00f3n.,\\\" Revista de Estudios Internacionales Mediterr\u00e1neos<\/em>, no. 26 (June 25, 2019), https:\/\/doi.org\/10.15366\/reim2019.26.002<\/a>. or Saloua Zerhouni, Explaining Youth Participation and Non-Participation in Morocco<\/em> (Mohammed V University in Rabat, 2017).\",\"id\":\"a8dee653-0757-48a1-bee3-ecedecb54376\"},{\"content\":\"\u00a0Interview with Hassan, a youth activist\",\"id\":\"37ca8230-6f30-4840-9937-12a37fbfb2f5\"},{\"content\":\"\u00a0Interview with Benissa, a youth activist\",\"id\":\"0552b6d9-4432-4edf-8a18-6064e86d4879\"},{\"content\":\"Five more states use the system of legislated candidate quotas\",\"id\":\"710967fe-9ef3-428b-bc70-ac4a9e890a81\"},{\"content\":\"InterParliamentary Union, Youth participation in national parliaments years of empowering youth in parliament 10<\/em> (IPU, 2021).\",\"id\":\"a434b03f-5b88-4b28-b9b0-a5a8a97daea7\"},{\"content\":\"Hassan Benadad, \\\"Gouvernement: voici la moyenne d'\u00e2ge des nouveaux ministres,\\\" Le 360 Fran\u00e7ais, October 8, 2021, https:\/\/fr.le360.ma\/politique\/gouvernement-voici-la-moyenne-dage-des-nouveaux-ministres-247123\/<\/a>.\",\"id\":\"db843472-6240-4f65-8898-2061e72222ac\"},{\"content\":\"\\\"Nouveau gouvernement. L\u2019Ex\u00e9cutif le plus r\u00e9duit depuis Abdallah Ibrahim,\\\" LesEco.ma, October 11, 2019, https:\/\/leseco.ma\/maroc\/nouveau-gouvernement-l-executif-le-plus-reduit-depuis-abdallah-ibrahim.html<\/a>.\",\"id\":\"b1def5a9-0a77-4959-b3db-9a0d292e173c\"},{\"content\":\"\\\"57.2 ans, moyenne d\u2019\u00e2ge du gouvernement Tebboune!,\\\" Echorouk, May 27, 2017, https:\/\/www.echoroukonline.com\/57-2-ans-moyenne-dage-du-gouvernement-tebboune<\/a>.\",\"id\":\"5b4677d0-f415-4d48-a40a-be573025acbc\"}]"},"story-category":[94],"project-category":[],"project-region":[315],"story-tag":[110],"class_list":["post-6436","storiesprojects","type-storiesprojects","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","story-category-research-content","project-region-africa","story-tag-research-on-youth-political-participation"],"acf":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/youthdemocracycohort.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/storiesprojects\/6436","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/youthdemocracycohort.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/storiesprojects"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/youthdemocracycohort.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/storiesprojects"}],"version-history":[{"count":9,"href":"https:\/\/youthdemocracycohort.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/storiesprojects\/6436\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7876,"href":"https:\/\/youthdemocracycohort.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/storiesprojects\/6436\/revisions\/7876"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/youthdemocracycohort.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6558"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/youthdemocracycohort.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6436"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"story-category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/youthdemocracycohort.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/story-category?post=6436"},{"taxonomy":"project-category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/youthdemocracycohort.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/project-category?post=6436"},{"taxonomy":"project-region","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/youthdemocracycohort.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/project-region?post=6436"},{"taxonomy":"story-tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/youthdemocracycohort.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/story-tag?post=6436"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}