Chapter 2. by Mehmet İlhanlı

The Impact of Young People’s Securitisation on Youth Activism in Türkiye, by Mehmet İlhanlı

Türkiye has a long tradition of youth activism, in which student movements have historically played a pivotal role in shaping the country’s political landscape. While such activism has often faced challenges from the state, the 2013 Gezi Park protests marked a turning point in Turkish political history. In the aftermath of these youth-led demonstrations, which directly confronted the government’s authority, the Turkish state increasingly began to securitise politically active young people.

By framing these young citizens as a threat to national stability, the government justified the use of extraordinary security measures, heightened surveillance, and criminalising narratives. This process of securitisation has effectively marginalised young people’s activism and systematically excluded them from political participation. This study investigates how such securitisation strategies have transformed the nature of youth political engagement in the country.

Türkiye currently has the largest youth population in the country’s history, yet this demographic’s potential to influence democratic processes is overlooked and often suppressed.^[i] Recent research, including a 2022 report by KONDA Research & Consultancy, reveals strikingly low levels of youth political involvement, with only 4% engaged in civil society organisations and just 5% registered as members of political parties.^[ii] These findings are underscored by the European Partnership for Democracy’s 2025 Global Youth Participation Index, in which Türkiye scored only 55 out of 100.^[iii]

Rather than signalling political apathy, this trend points to a deeper sense of alienation produced by the systemic exclusion and repression of Türkiye’s young people. The resulting marginalisation constrains youth participation in political processes and decision-making while accelerating democratic erosion and weakening political resilience, as reflected in Türkiye’s declining scores in major global democracy indices.^[iv]

Through in-depth interviews and focus groups, this study foregrounds the lived experiences of young people in Türkiye. Drawing on participants’ accounts, the research examines how securitisation processes have shaped young people’s political engagement and constrained their modes of participation.

Methodology

This qualitative research draws on 10 semistructured interviews with youth activists and policy experts aged 18–35 as well as four focus group discussions with participants in recent youth-led movements. Each focus group included between three and five people. Data was collected online and face to face from February to November 2025. Fieldwork took place in Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, and Diyarbakır, cities chosen for their political diversity and histories of youth mobilisation.

The findings of this study are not intended to be generalised. This limitation stems from two main factors. First, the interviewees and focus group participants constitute a relatively visible circle of youth activism, selected specifically because of the state’s repression of them. While these cases are not representative of all young people, they are analytically significant in that they exemplify broader patterns of youth securitisation in Türkiye. Second, all participants were based in urban settings, so the experiences and impacts discussed cannot be directly extended to rural youth populations. Within this scope, the data reveals experiences of criminalisation, perceptions of political participation and activism, and the impact of securitised political spaces on young people in urban settings.

All conversations were audio-recorded with the participants’ consent, transcribed, translated, and thematically analysed. Ethical principles were clearly communicated orally before and at the end of each interview and were strictly observed throughout the research process. To ensure confidentiality, all participants were assigned pseudonyms.

The context of youth activism in Türkiye

In 2021, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan delivered these words to a youth event in Ankara:

The youth we need is one that, just like we see here today, is wholeheartedly devoted to their country and nation, equipped with all the capabilities of the modern age, guided by a strong sense of direction, and fully aware of where they are headed. We do not divide our youth into letters or generations. From A to Z, we embrace all of them through works, services, and initiatives that unite rather than separate.^[v]

In another statement in 2012, shared on Twitter (now X), he said: “The goal is 2071, young people. God willing, we will build 2023, and hopefully, you will build 2071.”^[vi] These remarks referred to Türkiye’s official vision projects for 2071, which the ruling Justice and Development Party has promoted as milestones for shaping the nation’s future. In this framework, young people are seen as key actors in building a “new Türkiye”, but only if they conform to the vision defined by the state.

Erdoğan’s frequent emphasis on young people as bearers of “national ideals” constructs a selective vision of this demographic. Young people are perceived not just as individuals with agency, but as vessels of a particular ideological mission. Ideal young people in this context are described as pious, nationalist, technologically competent, and obedient to the state’s moral and political values. While Erdoğan claims to embrace all young people “from A to Z”, in practice there is a deep division between those who align with this vision and those who do not.

This division produces two opposing models of young people. On the one hand are those who are loyal to the government’s religious and nationalist values. On the other hand, any youth group that expresses dissent, adopts opposition ideologies, or engages in political activism outside state-sanctioned channels is portrayed as a threat to the national order.

Such youth groups are often subjected to various forms of securitisation. This concept refers to a process in which political actors frame particular issues or groups as security threats to justify extraordinary measures beyond normal political procedures.^[vii] While securitisation is primarily a discursive act, scholars have emphasised that the context in which it unfolds, as well as the power dynamics that shape it, must also be taken into account.^[viii]

These dynamics help explain how securitising moves not only rely on speech acts but also permeate institutions, bureaucracies, and practices. It can therefore be argued that the success of an attempt at securitisation depends on its discursive acceptance as well as how embedded it is in institutions and how it is enacted in practice.^[ix]

Youth securitisation has been widely discussed in the context of global and regional peace and security.^[x] Recent research has expanded to examine youth-led dissident movements and state responses at the national level.^[xi] In the Turkish case, youth securitisation involves the discursive construction of particular dissident groups of young people as “unstable, deviant [and] potentially degenerate” figures who are perceived as a threat to the stability of the state and the social order.^[xii] At the same time, it encompasses institutional practices, from policing to legal restrictions, that translate these discourses into security-oriented constraints on youth political participation.

Although securitising narratives against young people have intensified in recent years, they are not unique to the current government. Throughout the second half of the 20th century, young people in Türkiye were labelled as foreign agents, deviants, or tools of western influence and subjected to state violence and repression.^[xiii] Viewed through this lens, there is continuity in youth securitisation over time.

However, the 2013 Gezi Park protests marked a significant turning point. According to several polls, most of the protesters were young people.^[xiv] In response to the demonstrations, the Turkish government began to frame the protests not as a social movement but as an attempted coup. As a result, securitising narratives intensified, and young people were cast as agents of chaos and moral decay. One example of this discourse can be seen in the following government-aligned statement:

We did not see the youth of the Gezi Park violent protests out on the streets … Amid all this diversity, everyone was there, but the violent children of Gezi, the vulgar revolutionaries, were not. Because they were never truly part of this society. They were always marginal, always incidental, always troublemakers … They didn’t just loot cash machines and shops; they also burned, destroyed, and looted the sanctities, common ground, and shared values of this country and society.^[xv]

In the years after the Gezi Park protests, this framing was repeatedly invoked to criminalise youth-led activism. Many participants were arrested and imprisoned. Subsequent youth movements – such as the Boğaziçi University Student Protests, the Barınamıyoruz Movement, 1,000 Youth for Palestine, and, most recently, the 19 March Protests – have also been criminalised and their young participants targeted with similar securitising narratives.^[xvi] Government figures often portray these movements as renewed Gezi Park–style attempts, reinforcing the notion that youth activism that challenges the government threatens national unity.

The impact of this securitisation has been profound. Many young people, in the face of criminalisation, legal risks, and shrinking civic space, have retreated from formal avenues of political participation. In 2022, only 4% of young people in Türkiye took part in civil society organisations, and approximately 80% [MI1] [BY2] were neither affiliated with a political party nor considered joining one.^[xvii]

Experiences of youth securitisation

This section examines how youth securitisation was experienced and interpreted by the research participants, with particular attention on state discourses, institutional practices, and their consequences for youth political engagement. The findings are organised around key thematic patterns that illustrate the multifaceted impact of securitisation on youth activism.

“Acceptable” versus “unacceptable” youth activism

A significant majority of participants agreed that the Turkish state increasingly perceives youth movements that are not pro-government as potential security threats, rather than as democratic and legal actors. This perception is often tied to the duality of “our youth” (that is, the government’s) versus “not our youth”.^[xviii]

This duality refers to the boundaries set by the government: as long as youth activism remains outside the government’s threat perception, it is considered acceptable. However, once this boundary is crossed, youth activism becomes a matter of security. One interviewee illustrated this point with an example from his own life:

We were holding a small youth gathering somewhere. Outside the door, there were three anti-riot water cannon vehicles, five armoured vehicles, 50 riot police, and maybe 10 undercover officers. There was always this constant sense of being perceived as a security threat.^[xix]

Tactics to prevent youth activism

Youth is a transitional period from puberty to adulthood, during which young people prepare for the responsibilities of adult life. For this transition to be healthy, young people’s economic, social, and political needs must be fulfilled. When these needs are not met, young people begin to demand them through various mechanisms, particularly activism.

In Türkiye, once the government perceives these demands as a threat, it employs certain tactics and measures to suppress them. One of the most apparent tactics, mentioned by several participants, is economic sanctions:

Participant 1: So even if you don’t think like them, you’re forced to stay on their side. Because they put you under economic pressure.

Participant 2: For example, I know from my friends, some of them are very oppositional, but at the end of the day, because they’re unemployed, it is turned into a kind of joke. Like, “I am going to close my Instagram account and open a new one, with a suit, a Turkish flag, and references to the presidency.” It’s a joke, but it’s based on reality.

Participant 1: Yes, definitely, the first layer of pressure is economic sanctions.^[xx]

In addition to the state, the family is also considered to hold authority over young people in Türkiye. To suppress youth movements, the state seeks to collaborate with families and uses them as a means to control the young. One participant emphasised that families are often mobilised to prevent young people from engaging in activism:

What they [the authorities] do is very concrete – for example, they call the families first and tell them their children are involved with terrorist organisations. By creating distance between the youth and their families and triggering a reaction from the parents, they aim to push young people away from these movements.^[xxi]

Another tactic highlighted in interviews was to threaten young people with consequences that affect their future. The government attempts to discourage young people from engaging in activism by restricting their access to public-sector jobs:

Once your photo or video is taken, you’re done. You won’t be able to work in any government institution. That’s the kind of message they’re trying to send. Naturally, this creates a sense of fear among young people.^[xxii]

The impact of securitisation on youth activism

Youth securitisation in Türkiye has had a profound effect on how young people perceive and engage with political life. Based on the interviews and focus groups analysed in this study, five key patterns emerge: fear, political disengagement, re-engagement with the far right, fragmentation, and emotional fatigue.

Across all interviews and focus groups, the most consistent theme was the internalisation of fear. Participants described a political climate in which even attending a peaceful protest could have long-term professional and legal consequences.

Another dominant theme was disengagement from conventional politics. This retreat is rooted not in apathy but in distrust with systems that are perceived as exclusionary and unresponsive. As civic space narrows and repression increases, young people tend to distance themselves from conventional avenues and seek alternative forms of politics:

So, after the Gezi [Park] protests in 2013, many more young people got involved [in politics and activism]. During that period, youth participation increased significantly, with some youth organisations growing from 50 to 500 members. But after 2015, this trend reversed dramatically … Now, even joining a youth association or political party makes people hesitate and overthink their decisions.^[xxiii]

In some cases, youth disengagement from traditional politics leads not to apathy but to a turn towards radical far-right ideologies. Frustrated by economic and social insecurities, some young people seek a sense of safety and belonging in nationalist or exclusionary movements.^[xxiv] According to the participants in one of the focus groups, this shift reflects a broader crisis caused by youth securitisation:

In general, young people are searching for political alternatives. And this search is not limited to Türkiye. It is part of a global trend where [the system] is pushing young people towards more antidemocratic alternatives and right-wing discourse.^[xxv]

According to another respondent, the repression of youth activism creates a duality in which those already involved become radicalised, while potential young activists are driven by fear and gradually withdraw:

Participation in those protests and interest in these issues tend to deepen the political engagement of young people already involved. But at the same time, it pushes away those who are politically interested but remain distant. In other words, it radicalises those on the inside while deradicalising and distancing those observing from the outside.^[xxvi]

The government’s securitisation of young people not only suppresses dissent but also actively works to divide the youth population. By labelling some young people as acceptable and others as threats, according to one respondent, the government fractures solidarity and prevents collective political action:

During the Gezi [Park] protests, people from all political parties were present and everyone was united under a common language and shared cause. But now, for example, [People’s Equality and Democracy] Party supporters have been beaten and excluded. This is clearly a result of deep polarisation, which itself is a consequence of the government’s systematic policies.^[xxvii]

Finally, years of the state’s punitive responses and increasing polarisation have left many young people emotionally exhausted. Feelings of hopelessness, frustration, and alienation are widespread, particularly among those who once believed in the transformative power of collective action:

Young people have a good understanding of Türkiye’s recent history. They see that things ended up like this because people did not speak out in the past. The young people I spoke with, those who join protests, are fully aware of all these problems. But they say: “I am afraid. I am really afraid.” They are scared of becoming unemployed, of having no future.^[xxviii]

Conclusion

As Türkiye continues to experience a democratic decline, the country’s largest-ever youth population, which comprises 22.7% of the total, is feeling the impacts most acutely.^[xxix] Young people are not disengaged from politics by nature; rather, they are systematically excluded, stigmatised, and securitised. While many continue to fight for a more democratic and just society, their activism is often met with repression, surveillance, and criminalisation. This not only weakens democratic resilience in the country but also erodes youth trust in institutions and traditional politics.

Despite these challenges, young people have not given up. They continue to seek alternative spaces for political expression. However, unless the securitising lens through which the state views young people is dismantled, true democratic inclusion will remain elusive. The de-securitisation of young people and the enabling of their meaningful participation are therefore not merely youth issues but central tasks for the future of democracy in Türkiye. Supporting young people as political agents, not as threats, is essential for any inclusive and resilient democratic transformation in the country.

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[i] “Joint statement on the deepening democratic crisis and the systematic suppression of youth-led mobilisation in Türkiye”, European Youth Forum, 28 March 2025, https://www.youthforum.org/news/statement-on-deepening-democratic-crisis-and-the-systematic-suppression-of-youth-led-mobilisation-in-turkiye.

[ii] KONDA Research & Consultancy, “Gençlerin İnsan Hakları Algısı” [Young People’s Perceptions of Human Rights], Hakikat Adalet Hafıza Merkezi, 2022, https://hakikatadalethafiza.org/yayinlar/genclerin-insan-haklari-algisi-kamuoyu-arastirmasi.

[iii] “Explore Youth Participation in Türkiye”, Global Youth Participation Index, European Partnership for Democracy, 2025, https://gypi.epd.eu/country-reports/tr.

[iv] “Freedom in the World 2025”, Freedom House, 2025; “Democracy Index 2024: What’s wrong with representative democracy?”, Economist Intelligence Unit, 2025.

[v] “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, Başkent Millet Bahçesi’nde gerçekleştirilen Yerel Yönetimler Gençlik Festivali’ne katıldı” [President Erdoğan attended the Local Administrations Youth Festival held at the Başkent Nation’s Garden], Communications Directorate of the Turkish Presidency, 17 November 2021, https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/turkce/yerel_basin/detay/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-baskent-millet-bahcesinde-gerceklestirilen-yerel-yonetimler-genclik-festivaline-katildi.

[vi] Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, “Hedef 2071 gençler. Rabbim lütfederse bizler 2023’ü, İnşallah sizler de 2071’i inşa edeceksiniz” [Our goal is 2071, young people. God willing, we will build 2023, and you will build 2071], X, 30 September 2012, accessed 16 July 2025, https://x.com/RTErdogan/status/252349407981355008.

[vii] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner Pub, 1997).

[viii] Thierry Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context”, European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 2 (2005): 171–201.

[ix] Ole Wæver, “The theory act: Responsibility and exactitude as seen from securitization”, International Relations 29, no. 1 (2015): 121–27.

[x] Mayssoun Sukarieh and Stuart Tannock, “The global securitisation of youth”, Third World Quarterly 39, no. 5 (2018): 854–70.

[xi] Kerman Calvo and Martin Portos, “Securitization, Repression, and the Criminalization of Young People’s Dissent: An Introduction”, Revista Internacional de Sociología 77, no. 4 (2019): 1–6; Juan García-García and Kerman Calvo Borobia, “Repressing the Masses: Newspapers and the Securitisation of Youth Dissent in Spain”, Revista Internacional de Sociología 77, no. 4 (2019).

[xii] Emma Murphy, “The In-securitisation of Youth in the South and East Mediterranean”, The International Spectator 53, no. 2 (2018): 21–37.

[xiii] Demet Lüküslü, “Creating a pious generation: youth and education policies of the AKP in Turkey”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2016.

[xiv] “Gezi Raporu: Toplumun ‘Gezi Parkı Olayları’ algısı – Gezi Parkındakiler kimlerdi?” [Gezi Report: Public Perception of the “Gezi Park Events” – Who were the people in Gezi Park?], KONDA Research & Consultancy, 2014, https://konda.com.tr/rapor/67/gezi-raporu.

[xv] İsmail Çağlar, “Gezi’nin Şedit ve Vandal Gençleri” [The Violent and Vandalistic Youth of Gezi], SETA Foundation, 1 June 2017, https://www.setav.org/kose-yazilari/gezinin-sedit-ve-vandal-gencleri.

[xvi] Boğaziçi University Student Protests is a movement that began in 2021 against the president’s appointment of a rector, demanding academic freedom and university autonomy. Barınamıyoruz Movement is a student-led protest that highlights Türkiye’s housing crisis by sleeping in parks to draw attention to unaffordable rent and dormitory fees. 1,000 Youth for Palestine is a youth-led initiative that has mobilised thousands of young people in solidarity with Palestine, organising demonstrations against Israeli policies. 19 March Protests is a wave of protests sparked by a court ruling that paved the way for the removal of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu.

[xvii] KONDA, “Gençlerin”.

[xviii] In-depth interview no. 5, 2025.

[xix] In-depth interview no. 7, 2025.

[xx] Focus group discussion no. 1, 2025.

[xxi] In-depth interview no. 4, 2025.

[xxii] In-depth interview no. 2, 2025.

[xxiii] In-depth interview no. 5, 2025.

[xxiv] Demet Lüküslü and Begüm Uzun, “Türkiye – Committed Democrats Yet Ardent Nationalists: Turkey’s Youth: at the Crossroads”, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2024; “Gençlerin Politik Tercihleri Araştırması” [Research on Political Preferences of the Youth], Gençlik Örgütleri Forumu, 2024.

[xxv] Focus group discussion no. 2, 2025.

[xxvi] In-depth interview no. 4, 2025.

[xxvii] In-depth interview no. 1, 2025.

[xxviii] In-depth interview no. 1, 2025.

[xxix] “Youth Policy in Türkiye”, European Commission, 21 July 2025, https://national-policies.eacea.ec.europa.eu/youthwiki/chapters/turkey/overview?utm_source=chatgpt.com.